Lessons from a Plague
Max D. Siegel*
This Article argues that we ought to examine this country’s early AIDS crisis for lessons
on addressing HIV as well as to improve the ongoing social movement of sexual minorities in the
United States. In the 1980s and early 1990s, AIDS influenced sexual minorities’ advocacy
efforts as both liberationists working to deregulate sexuality and integrationists seeking access
to heterosexual privilege recognized that their agendas needed to acknowledge this new crisis.
Over time, a liberationist response to AIDS emerged and dominated the social movement
because sexual minorities had to publicly defend their differences in order to stay alive.
Decades later, without the horrific, unifying force of the early AIDS crisis, elites at the helm of
the social movement have taken an integrationist turn. Movement elites now favor integrationist
objectives like marriage, neglecting the pressing needs of their marginalized movement
counterparts. By honoring key lessons from the early AIDS crisis and using the momentum of
the modern integrationist movement to advance more liberationist goals, sexual minorities have
the power to propel society toward greater justice for all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Social movements are indispensable to law’s development. They help conceptualize
legislative initiatives and guide judicial interpretation of new statutes.1 In the context of the
* Ryan H. Easley Research Fellow, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. Thank you to the
journal for its incredible work as well as to Sanjay De, Sue McCarty, and Danielle Keats Citron.
1
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
419, 419 (2001) (“Social movements generated many important statutes we now take for granted, such as the
environmental and civil rights laws. The dynamics of statutory evolution are strongly influenced by those
movements and their internal dynamics.”). See generally Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61
EMORY L.J. 663, 666–69 (2012) (describing scholarship on cause lawyering that examines the relationship between

293

WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW

[VOL. 4:292

Fourteenth Amendment, social movements have defined our Constitution.2 Identity-based social
movements have had an especially salient impact on modern American law, which has
marginalized women and minorities and thus given them powerful reasons to unify behind
aspirations for shared social, political, and legal advancements.3 Particularly in the past three
decades, legal actors and others seeking to subjugate sexual minorities4 have triggered mass
mobilization as traumatic subordination has served as a clarion call for collective activism.5
To be sure, oppressive laws have never guaranteed a social movement.6 Progress for
minorities frequently comes at a high cost, with repercussions including unemployment, lifethreatening violence, and criminal penalties.7 Various factors have facilitated the mobilization of
sexual minorities, such as the effect of urbanization to concentrate non-heterosexual-identified
individuals in large cities8 and the increased accessibility of ideas and records of shared
experience that unite sexual minorities while discrediting homophobia.9 Moreover, Professor
litigation and intragroup difference, sociolegal work on legal mobilization within social movements, and social
movement theory analyzing how movements materialize, operate, persuade, and survive).
2
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 419 (“Social movements have been one engine driving constitutional evolution as
well. The modern meaning of the Equal Protection Clause owes much more to the power and norms of the civil
rights and women’s liberation movements than to the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers.”).
3
See id. at 423–25 (explaining that advocates for sexual minorities were among the most important social
movements of the second half of the twentieth century and that “[l]aw and legal discourse played an unusually
important rule in the formation of these [identity-based social movements]” by helping to “define a class of people
whose social identity was dominated by a legally stigmatizing trait” and imposing costs giving “various groups
stronger reasons to band together and to transform social attitudes”).
4
This Article uses the term “sexual minority” to denote individuals who do not identify with widespread notions of
heterosexuality. Heterosexuality is used in its contemporary meaning of an exclusive, intimate relationship between
a biologically and socially identified man and woman, although the term was first used to label “mental
hermaphrodites” and the so-called mental disorder of being attracted to both men and women. See James G.
Kiernan, Responsibility in Sexual Perversion, 3 CHI. MED. REC. 185, 199 n.30 (1892). This Article generally avoids
the language of gay and straight, including the popular abbreviation “LGBT,” because sexuality and sexual identity
exist on continua. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638 (1948).
5
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 426 (discussing advocates for sexual minorities and other identity-based social
movements and observing that “legal actors hostile to minorities gave minority agenda entrepreneurs the crises or
dramatic events they needed to trigger mass mobilization against stigmatizing policies and attitudes” and that the
mass mobilization of such movements “was not easily possible without the state as both adversary (state enforcers)
and ally (legislature sometimes, the judiciary more often)”).
6
See id. at 432–33 (asserting that legal exclusions and stigmas helped trigger identity-based social movements but
“did not assure that minority people would form a social movement, for law could also raise the costs of objecting to
stigmatic exclusions”).
7
See id. at 438 (explaining that the cost imposed by legal and societal trait-based shaming and discrimination
“provides a reason for marginalized people to engage in activism to change the norm” but “[t]he cost of a stigma,
however, does not provide a sufficient reason for this activism” when the price of participation, such as “social
ostracism, loss of employment, state harassment, and sometimes imprisonment or lynching,” is greater than the
benefits). Moreover, sexual minorities that believe they deserve their subjugation may lack the sense of self-worth
to struggle for change. See id. at 439 (“A social group defined and penalized by legal stigmas will not have an
incentive to organize so long as most of its members view their stigma as justified, acceptable, or inevitable.”).
8
See generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955, 957 (2012)
(“Cities have been the engine of legal developments and innovations concerning sexual orientation since the advent
of the gay rights struggle during the 1970s, and they are still at the forefront of the most contentious issues
pertaining to gays and lesbians.”).
9
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 441–42 (describing policies that “fueled this aborning solidarity with information
and ideas that undermined the foundations of stigmatizing discrimination” and underscoring urbanization, literature
that helped sexual minorities learn that others felt as they did, and access to scientific papers rejecting nonheterosexual status as a mental abnormality).
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William Eskridge has described “mobilization moments, where representatives of the old status
regime took a firm position against identity-based protesters insisting on a new normative
regime—but with disastrous consequences for the old regime.”10
The archetypal mobilization moment for sexual minorities was Stonewall.11 On June 27,
1969, police engaged in a then-routine method of harassing sexual minorities by raiding the
Stonewall Inn, a popular recreational spot in New York’s City’s Greenwich Village.12 A few
customers fought back, which was remarkable at the time, leading to nights of demonstrations
and riots with thousands gathering in Greenwich Village.13 The Village Voice extensively
covered the events that, Eskridge explained, “[l]iterally overnight, . . . transformed a homophile
movement of several hundred earnest homosexuals into a gay liberation movement populated by
tens of thousands . . . who formed hundreds of new organizations demanding radical changes in
the way gay people are treated by the state.”14 Recognizing this mobilization moment’s
significance, President Barack Obama described the Stonewall protesters in his 2013 Inaugural
Address as “forebears” guided by the star “that all of us are created equal.”15
A recent exchange between Judge Richard Posner and writer Andrew Sullivan implicated
another series of mobilization moments that this article will examine in serious detail: the early
AIDS crisis.16 In May 2012, inspired by President Obama’s declaration of support for marriage
equality, Judge Posner blogged various reasons why same-sex marriage “no longer seem[ed] a
hot issue.”17 According to Judge Posner, “[i]n the 1950s, when I was growing up, homosexuals
had, as homosexuals, no rights,” but, “[b]eginning in the 1960s and accelerating dramatically in
the 1990s and 2000s, legal changes and changes in public attitudes resulted in the dismantling of
most public and private discriminatory measures against homosexuals.”18
While Judge Posner found “something of a puzzle” in why “resistance seemed to melt
away rather than having to be overcome by militant action,” he asserted that with more tolerance
for non-marital sex and cohabitation, as well as “the decline of prudery,” heterosexuals
experienced less revulsion over “deviant sexual practices.”19 Similarly, as sexual minorities
became more visible to heterosexuals, “the latter discovered that homosexuals are for the most
part indistinguishable from heterosexuals, and this created sympathy for homosexuals’ desire to
be treated equally with heterosexuals both generally and in regard to marriage.”20 Most
10

Id. at 458.
Id. at 456–57.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 457.
14
Id.
15
Press Release, President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama.
16
When discussing the policy and legal implications of the AIDS crisis, this Article employs HIV and AIDS
interchangeably. However, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the causative agent of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Basic Information About HIV and AIDS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). HIV is commonly
transmitted through human blood, breast milk, and sexual fluids, and it attacks the body’s CD4+ T Cells, which help
fight diseases. Id. AIDS develops if HIV has severely damaged an individual’s immune system. Id.
17
Judge Richard Posner, Homosexual Marriage—Posner, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (May 13, 2012, 4:33 PM),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/05/homosexual-marriageposner.html.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. For a brief account of the impact of modern changes in popular attitudes toward sexual minorities
acknowledging the oppressive dimensions of assimilation into heterosexuality, see KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE
HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 19 (2006).
11
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important to Judge Posner was the gradual realization by heterosexuals that sexual orientation
was not a choice or caused by seduction or recruitment.21 After noting the failure of prevention
efforts to “cure” non-heterosexuals and Republican leaders’ “tacit acknowledgment that
homosexual marriage, and homosexuals rights in general, have no economic significance,” Judge
Posner concluded, “[i]t seems that the only remaining basis for opposition to homosexual
marriage, or to legal equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals in general, is religious.”22
Responding to Judge Posner’s attempt to explain the “sea change in gay rights,” gayidentified Sullivan argued that Posner made a crucial omission when he failed to consider the
early AIDS crisis.23 For Sullivan, our collective consciousness shifted as a consequence of, in a
decade’s time, losing more than 300,000 young people to AIDS.24 Sullivan explained that
“polling on gay rights has seen an accelerating transformation” in comparison to relatively stable
public sentiment on other issues like abortion because, as a consequence of AIDS, “[p]eople
discovered[ed] gay people in their own families and among their friends and co-workers,”
causing their attitudes to “shift very suddenly.”25
Taking cues from Sullivan and Posner’s disagreement, this Article leverages the AIDS
pandemic and its activists to examine the bidirectional relationship between HIV and sexual
minorities. This Article seeks to deconstruct “the puzzle” of advancing rights for sexual
minorities but rejects Posner’s notion that “resistance seemed to melt away rather than having to
be overcome by militant action.”26 Like Stonewall, AIDS fostered a series of conflicts in which
an old status regime took disastrous positions against identity-based protesters insisting on a new
normative regime. Ongoing contemplation of the mobilization moments of the AIDS crisis in
Just as I had moved through . . . demands for assimilation as an individual, the gay community had
done so as a group. Through the middle of the twentieth century, gays were routinely asked to
convert to heterosexuality, whether through lobotomies, electroshock therapy, or psychoanalysis.
As the gay rights movement gained strength, the demand to convert gradually ceded to the demand
to pass. This shift can be seen in the military’s adoption in 1993 of the “Don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy, under which gays are permitted to serve so long as we agree to pass. Finally, at
millennium’s turn, the demand to pass is giving way to the demand to cover—gays are
increasingly permitted to be gay and out so long as we do not “flaunt” our identities. The
contemporary resistance to gay marriage can be understood as a covering demand: Fine, be gay,
but don’t shove it in our faces.
Id.
Posner, supra note 17. Judge Posner elaborated on explanations why “a combination of genetic factors . . . and
prenatal and other biological factors cause homosexuality” after remarking “[t]hat there is a genetic component in
homosexuality may seem paradoxical, since homosexuals produce on average fewer offspring than heterosexuals,
which might lead one to expect that over time homosexuality would diminish and eventually disappear—which of
course has not happened.” Id. These explanations included that “in the harsh ancestral environment in which
human beings evolved, there was a tradeoff between number and survival of offspring,” and “[b]oth menopause and
homosexuality are ways of increasing the ratio of adult caregivers to children, since homosexuals can provide care
to their nephews and nieces and menopausal women to their grandchildren, without either group having obligations
to their own children.” Id. An alternative theory that Judge Posner articulated, “for which there is some evidence, is
that male homosexuality has survived because the female relatives of male homosexuals are more fertile than
women who have no male homosexual relatives.” Id.
22
Id. Judge Posner then cautioned that, as a non-theocracy, the United States “should hesitate to enact laws that
serve religious rather than pragmatic secular aims, such as material welfare and national security.” Id.
23
Andrew Sullivan, How Have Gays Won?, THE DISH (May 14, 2012, 4:41 PM),
http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/05/14/how-have-gays-won/.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Posner, supra note 17.
21
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the United States serves both contemporary endeavors to address HIV and the identity-based
social movement of sexual minorities. AIDS reset the movement’s agenda, forcing sexual
minorities to publicly defend their differences to stay alive. After years of advocacy, HIV
remains an ongoing tragedy in the United States, and remedying injustices such as those
experienced by all varieties of sexual minorities continues to be vital.
Part I analyzes how notions of identity have shaped the U.S. response to HIV by
summarizing the country’s statistical and social vision of HIV and contextualizing these
perceptions as the foundation of the federal response. This Article then contrasts the moralizing
impulses that have influenced the American reaction to HIV with the promise of the Obama
Administration and the National HIV/AIDS Strategy,27 which meets stigma28 and the challenge
of AIDS-related identity politics head-on. HIV and AIDS are far from eradicated, and an
effective response continues to depend on addressing inequality across various aspects of policy
and the law.
In evaluating how the AIDS crisis has guided the contemporary trajectory of American
sexual minority rights, Part II reconciles attitudes toward sexual minorities and the stigmatization
of individuals living with HIV. The more mainstream HIV became, the weaker the stigma
associated with the virus, but without the same urgency to rally against the AIDS crisis, sexual
minorities have become more internally divided. In the absence of the earlier American
epidemic’s horrific, unifying force, the most elite set the movement’s advocacy agenda while
less politically empowered sexual minorities continue to live and die in silence. An
integrationist approach, such as one that strives to garner sympathy for the movement through
the claim “that homosexuals are for the most part indistinguishable from heterosexuals,”29
discounts valuable lessons from the AIDS crisis and disguises homogenization as social justice.30
A renewed focus on liberation—encompassing efforts to deregulate gender and sexuality while
safeguarding individual autonomy—is necessary if social, political, and legal advancements are
to fully reflect the shared struggles of sexual minorities in today’s United States. The
movement’s agenda must refocus on the differences it so powerfully defended during the earlier
years of AIDS and reapply its powerful integrationist mechanisms to the causes of a more
diverse array of movement constituents.
27

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES.
(2010), available at http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/NHAS.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L HIV/AIDS
STRATEGY FOR THE U.S.]. The White House released an implementation plan alongside the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy, and this Article will discuss both documents interchangeably. For the implementation plan, see THE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
(2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/nhas-implementation.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L
HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
28
See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1 (1963).
The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to
bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier.
The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or
a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places. Later,
in Christian times, two layers of metaphor were added to the term: the first referred to bodily signs
of holy grace that took the form of eruptive blossoms on the skin; the second, a medical allusion to
this religious allusion, referred to bodily signs of physical disorder.
Id.
29
Posner, supra note 17.
30
Cf. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 114 (1999)
(arguing that the privilege to marry for sexual minorities invigorates the normalizing power of marriage while
stigmatizing the unmarried and promoting heteronormativity).

297

WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW

[VOL. 4:292

II. AIDS IN THE KINGDOM OF THE WELL
Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born
holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick.
Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us is
obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place.31
Ronald Reagan set a low bar for American presidents when he commented publicly on
HIV for the first time nearly six years after the initial known cases of the virus.32 By the mid1980s, researchers had already published strong evidence that HIV could not be transmitted
through the air or casual contact.33 Despite what the federal government already knew about
HIV, President Reagan made his first public remarks on the subject in August 1985, just as
parents’ fear for children becoming infected through casual contact hit a frenzy.34 When asked
whether children with AIDS should be allowed to attend public schools, President Reagan
responded: “I’m glad I’m not faced with that problem.”35
President Reagan’s statement was an early manifestation of the United States’ national
alienation of individuals living with HIV. At a time when HIV-diagnosed people of all ages
experienced constant harassment and social isolation,36 President Reagan chose to cast children
living with HIV as “that problem” rather than harness his platform to disseminate evidencebased information about HIV transmission.37 Consequently, President Reagan elevated HIVuninfected Americans above those living with HIV and struggling for survival in the face of
ineffective treatment options38 and widespread social condemnation.39
Subsequently, the architects of American AIDS policy designed the country’s response to
a global health crisis around their discomfort. The AIDS pandemic materialized in the wake of
31

SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 3 (2001).
See Alex Wodak, The US War on Harm Reduction: Fixing Policy on Intelligence and Facts, 2 HARM REDUCTION
J. 14 (2005), http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-2-14.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction that
little changed with the three presidents that followed Ronald Reagan, who avoided public comment on HIV for the
first six years of the epidemic).
33
See Gilbert A. Partida, AIDS: Do Children with AIDS Have a Right to Attend School?, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 1041,
1042 (1985) (concluding that research had strongly indicated that HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact
and that transmission is not airborne).
34
See id. at 1047 (explaining that the debate over whether children living with AIDS should attend public schools
raged and “it is the parents of healthy school children whom the fear of AIDS has hit the hardest”).
35
See id. at 1045 (recollecting President Reagan’s first public comment on HIV).
36
See Anne Malcolm et al., HIV-related Stigmatization and Discrimination: Its Forms and Contexts, 8 CRITICAL
PUB. HEALTH 347, 356 (1998) (“The harassment and scapegoating of people with AIDS and those who are
suspected of being infected or belonging to a specific group has been widely reported since the beginning of the
epidemic.”).
37
This Article does not argue that AIDS represents a crisis without scientific uncertainty, but factual ambiguity is
not an adequate justification for irresponsible rhetoric. See PAULA A. TREICHLER, HOW TO HAVE THEORY IN AN
EPIDEMIC: CULTURAL CHRONICLES OF AIDS 16 (1999) (explaining that regardless of whether a scientist has learned
to properly converse with the media, “ambiguity and uncertainty are features of scientific inquiry to be socially and
linguistically managed”).
38
See Anthony S. Fauci, The AIDS Epidemic: Considerations for the 21st Century, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1046,
1047–48 (1999) (observing that AIDS-related mortality did not see a drastic decline until the mid-1990s when
improved prophylaxes against opportunistic infections and potent treatment became available).
39
See Malcolm et al., supra note 36, at 349 (arguing that discrimination against individuals living with HIV has
taken a variety of forms and that the emergence of HIV amplified the preexisting stigmatization of certain groups of
people, including sexual minorities, sex workers, drug users, migrants, and non-whites).
32
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the abstinence-only sex education movement,40 and key government bodies responded by
confining the individuals most affected by HIV within socially destructive caricatures.41 The
public morality that accompanied HIV in the 1980s and 1990s shaped various aspects of AIDS
policy,42 including groundbreaking legislation like the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS
Resources Emergency (“CARE”) Act.43
In the twenty-first century, newly empowered social conservatives in the United States
authored the international HIV policy agenda and fostered a religiously motivated, scientifically
flawed approach to prevention.44 Throughout the growth of the pandemic, individuals living
with and at highest risk for HIV have been frequently distrustful of health care institutions for
historical, representational, and other reasons, detracting from what relief efforts might have
accomplished had more people with HIV sought care.45 HIV continues to thrive among
politically disempowered populations,46 and the United States’ approach to ending AIDS is
simply inadequate.47
A. WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV
Although surveillance has provided an imperfect understanding of HIV,48
epidemiological profiles can promote understanding of the rationale behind the government’s
40

See Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Unconstitutional Entanglements: The Religious Right, the Federal Government, and
Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 495, 510 (2008) (observing that the abstinence-only
sexuality education movement emerged in the 1970s and 1980s alongside the New Right and grew from antiabortion, anti-sexual minority, and anti-sexuality education and religious groups).
41
See Brooke G. Schoepf, AIDS, History, and Struggles over Meaning, in HIV AND AIDS IN AFRICA: BEYOND
EPIDEMIOLOGY 15, 16 (Ezekiel Kalipeni et al. eds., 2004) (explaining that governments reacted to HIV by restricting
individuals living with HIV within “boundaries of stigma”).
42
See Sara Klemm, Keeping Prevention in the Crosshairs: A Better HIV Exposure Law for Maryland, 13 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 495, 497–98 (2010) (noting that state statutes that criminalize HIV transmission first emerged
from federal requirements in the Ryan White CARE Act and reflect the general public morality surrounding the HIV
pandemic).
43
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990).
Ryan White programs were last extended under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-87, 123 Stat. 2885 (2009); see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. See generally Steven R.
Keener, A Comparative Analysis of the Origins and Structure of Public Health Financing for HIV Care in the
United States and England, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1357, 1369-1375 (2008) (explaining how holes in Medicare
and Medicaid coverage prompted Congress to pass the Ryan White CARE Act and that the combination of these
three government programs usually means individuals who are aware of their status have access to quality care, but
not without continuing barriers to healthy outcomes).
44
See Holly Burkhalter, The Politics of AIDS: Engaging Conservative Activists, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 8, 8-10, 12-14
(2004) (describing the role of evangelicals in rallying political support for international AIDS initiatives and
recounting their flawed approach to HIV prevention).
45
See, e.g., Sheryl Thorburn Bird & Laura M. Bogart, Conspiracy Beliefs About HIV/AIDS and Birth Control
Among African Americans: Implications for the Prevention of HIV, Other STIs, and Unintended Pregnancy, 61 J.
SOC. ISSUES 109 (2005) (acknowledging many black Americans’ historically well-founded mistrust of medical
institutions and concluding that HIV prevention, treatment, and education efforts must acknowledge widely
disseminated conspiracy theories that blame the proliferation and continuation of HIV on the U.S. government).
46
See Wafaa M. El-Sadr et al., AIDS in America – Forgotten but Not Gone, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 967, 968 (2010)
(explaining that HIV remains common “among the disenfranchised and socially marginalized”).
47
See Chris Collins & Dazon Dixon Diallo, A Prevention Response That Fits America’s Epidemic: Community
Perspectives on the Status of HIV Prevention in the United States, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
S148, S148 (2010) (arguing that HIV prevention in the United States “is not designed to address this kind of
epidemic”).
48
See John M. Karon et al., HIV in the United States at the Turn of the Century: An Epidemic in Transition, 91 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1060, 1061 (2001) (“HIV incidence cannot be measured directly in the population, because many
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reaction to the AIDS crisis.49 Analysis of statistical information about the incidence, prevalence,
and demographic impact of HIV; trends in attitudes toward people living with the virus; and the
federal government’s earlier responses—the Ryan White CARE Act in particular—reveal the
role of identity politics in the country’s AIDS epidemic.50 These politics create a point of
contrast for recent improvements to federal AIDS policy as well as this Article’s
recommendations about how to continue to advance care and prevention efforts.51
1. PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND HIV STIGMA
The United States has experienced new HIV infections at a rapid rate. The country
reported more than half the world’s 70,000 AIDS cases between 1981 and 1988.52 Later, the
nation’s epidemiologists calculated the incidence somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 new
infections each year from 1987 to 1992.53 Researchers considered the rate of new infections
generally constant through the 1990s in the absence of national surveys that could provide
incidence estimates among specific groups or the general population.54 In 2008, breakthroughs
in surveillance technology improved epidemiologists’ understanding of HIV incidence in the
United States,55 exposing longstanding errors in past estimates that had placed annual incidence
closer to 40,000.56 New estimates showed that the country’s incidence had in fact increased at
the end of the 1990s57 to around 56,000 new adolescent and adult infections each year.58 In
December 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated annual HIV incidence
at around 50,000 new cases.59
The immense number of both diagnosed and undiagnosed individuals living with HIV in
the United States has long been cause for alarm. HIV prevalence is not directly observable

newly infected persons do not seek or are not offered an HIV test and there is no easily measured biomarker for
recent infection.”).
49
See id. at 1066 (claiming that surveillance data has been employed “to allocate federal resources for prevention
and treatment”).
50
See infra Part II.A.1.
51
See infra Part II.A. 2.
52
See James W. Curran et al., Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 SCIENCE 610, 610
(1988) (explaining that in the seven years since 1981, 127 countries had reported more than 70,000 cases and “well
over half have been reported from the United States”).
53
Philip S. Rosenberg, Scope of the AIDS Epidemic in the United States, 270 SCIENCE 1372, 1374 (1995).
54
See Karon et al., supra note 48, at 1064 (noting that in the absence of national surveys providing HIV incidence,
researchers approximated a relatively constant HIV incidence throughout the 1990s based on a summary of
estimates made in studies about persons with behavioral risks in select sample populations).
55
Formal estimates for HIV incidence in the United States shifted dramatically in 2008 when a transformative
article about HIV estimates surfaced in the Journal of the American Medical Association. See H. Irene Hall et al.,
Estimation of HIV Incidence in the United States, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 520, 520 (2008) (detailing a study that
“provides the first direct estimates of HIV incidence in the United States using laboratory technologies previously
implemented only in clinic-based settings”).
56
See id. at 525 (commenting that the previous method based on extrapolating from convenience samples estimated
HIV incidence at about 40,000 new infections each year).
57
See id. at 526 (explaining that incidence increased nationally at the end of the 1990s although it remained stable
and later declined among injection drug users).
58
See id. at 520 (estimating HIV incidence at around 55,400 new infections between 2003 and 2006 and 56,300 new
infections for the year 2006 and explaining that HIV incidence increased in the mid-1990s, declined after 1999, and
has remained stable ever since).
59
New HIV Infections in the United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/2012/HIV-Infections-2007-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
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because many individuals living with HIV have not been tested or reported.60 Those who are
undiagnosed are believed to disproportionately contribute to new infections, and this has led
researchers to advocate that increased access to testing and care could serve to prevent new cases
and improve disease surveillance.61 Nevertheless, epidemiologists have projected that more than
1.7 million individuals have been infected with HIV in the United States since 1981,62 and an
increasing number of Americans are living with HIV annually.63 At the end of 2006, roughly 1.1
million HIV-infected individuals resided in the United States,64 and about one-fifth of those
cases were undiagnosed.65
Although large percentages of people living with hemophilia were infected with HIV in
the 1980s,66 HIV has primarily thrived among socially marginalized and politically
disempowered communities. Men who have sex with men comprised the largest percentage of
new infections early in the epidemic,67 although injection drug users also experienced an overrepresentation in the initial outbreak. 68 From the outset, black Americans faced higher rates of
HIV infection than other racial groups.69 Today, men who have sex with men and most nonwhite populations continue to dominate new infections.70
HIV stigma refers to the impact of labeling, negative attributions, segregation, and
discrimination on the political, social, and financial existence of individuals living with HIV.71
HIV stigma has been difficult to measure,72 but it has been constant throughout the pandemic and
60

See Michael L. Campsmith et al., Undiagnosed HIV Prevalence Among Adults and Adolescents in the United
States at the End of 2006, 53 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 619, 619 (2010) (stating that “the
overall prevalence of persons living with HIV cannot be directly observed, as a percentage of persons infected with
HIV has not yet been tested, diagnosed, and reported to local disease surveillance programs”).
61
See id. (noting that research has indicated that those infected but not diagnosed disproportionately contribute to
annual HIV infections and explaining that “increasing the number of HIV-infected persons who are diagnosed and
linked with effective care and prevention programs have the potential to significantly reduce new HIV infections”).
62
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HIV/AIDS POLICY FACT SHEET (2012), available at
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/3029-13.pdf.
63
See Campsmith et al., supra note 60, at 622 (“The number of persons in the United States living with HIV
infection continues to increase each year.”).
64
See id. at 620 (“At the end of 2006, there were an estimated 1,106,400 . . . persons living with HIV infection in the
United States.”).
65
See id. at 621 (reporting that twenty-one percent of estimated prevalent HIV cases were undiagnosed at the end of
2006).
66
See Curran et al., supra note 52, at 612 (reporting that a conglomeration of HIV seroprevalence surveys conducted
among people living with hemophilia showed prevalence ranges between fifteen and over ninety percent depending
on severity of hemophilia).
67
See id. at 610 (noting that sixty-five percent of reported HIV cases were among men who had sex with men and
did not inject drugs while an additional eight percent of all HIV cases occurred among men who had sex men and
injected drugs).
68
See id. (“More than 60% of the 13,492 cases reported in heterosexual men and women were among those with a
history of IV drug abuse, representing 17% of total cases.”).
69
See Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 1374 (noting that the highest prevalence rates in the United States between the
years 1987 and 1992 were among young black men).
70
See Hall et al., supra note 55, at 520 (explaining that about half of new infections were among men who have sex
with men and black Americans).
71
See Laura C. Nyblade, Measuring HIV Stigma: Existing Knowledge and Gaps, 11 PSYCHOL. HEALTH & MED.
335, 336 (2006) (employing stigma as a proxy for the processes through which social and cognitive labeling,
negative attributions about human differences, separation schemas, and discrimination “converge in the context of
social, economic and political power”).
72
See id. at 341 (explaining that studies attempting to measure enacted stigma in the general population could not be
found in a literature review because “[t]he very presence of stigma means that asking any survey questions about a
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has created a bidirectional layering effect with the preexisting stigmatization already experienced
by the populations at highest risk for infection.73 The initial outbreak among men who have sex
with men and injection drug users stoked prejudice and facilitated early theories representing
HIV as the consequence of certain lifestyles and choices.74 In the United States, the
encouragement of severely castigatory manifestations of HIV stigma declined by 1990 as support
for quarantine and public identification of people living with AIDS dropped among American
adults to approximately one-in-five.75 A large portion of the United States continued to fear
individuals living with AIDS, and an increasing number of individuals believed that those
infected through sex or drug use deserved their illness.76 Today, many individuals as well as
medical and social institutions—including those responsible for HIV care—continue to
stigmatize individuals based on their status.77
2. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
HIV stigma has risen at both individual and institutional levels,78 crippling the American
relief effort and validating inequality.79 The negative effects of stigma have been amplified by
the course of HIV infection in the United States; HIV has ravaged populations with traditionally
limited access to medical institutions, and this has been especially problematic for ensuring HIV
care services reach those individuals who are in greatest need.80
respondent’s HIV status to the general public is unacceptable, removing the possibility of asking respondents
whether they themselves have experienced HIV stigma”).
73
See id. (stating that compound or layered stigma lacks measurement at the population level and is common among
groups like men who have sex with men, sex workers, and injection drug users).
74
See Warner C. Greene, A History of AIDS: Looking Back to See Ahead, 37 EUR. J. IMMUNOLOGY S94, S94 (2007)
(discussing how theories about the cause of HIV focused on “lifestyle” issues during the early epidemic and how
speculation about intravenous drug users, men who have sex with men, and HIV’s origins in Haiti fostered fear and
prejudice).
75
See Gregory M. Herek et al., HIV-Related Stigma and Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends,
1991-1999, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 375 (2002) (discussing survey trends that found “[t]he most punitive
aspects of AIDS stigma—support for quarantine and public identification of PWAs—diminished considerably [in
the 1990s], with fewer than 1 in 5 adults still supporting such measures by 1999”).
76
See id. at 375–76 (claiming that “it is disturbing that in 1999—nearly 2 decades after the beginning of the AIDS
epidemic in the United States—one fifth of those surveyed still feared PWAs,” and reporting that “[t]he proportion
of adults believing that a person infected with HIV through sex or drug use deserves to have AIDS increased over
the decade, peaking in 1997”).
77
See Judy E. Mill et al., Stigmatization as a Social Control Mechanism for Persons Living with HIV and AIDS, 20
QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1469, 1473–75 (2010) (describing people living with HIV who experienced AIDSmotivated shunning by their community, felt judged by their health care providers based on their status, and attended
institutions that placed “caution sheets” on their charts to alert providers of their condition).
78
See id. at 1470 (noting that “AIDS stigma has long been conceptualized as a personal attribute that evokes
discrimination” but arguing that “there is a need to understand how stigma influences professional and
organizational practice and permeates health policy”).
79
See Richard Parker & Peter Aggleton, HIV and AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual
Framework and Implications for Action, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 13, 16 (2003) (asserting that “we need to reframe our
understandings of stigmatization and discrimination to conceptualize them as social processes that can only be
understood in relation to broader notions of power and domination”). For an influential analysis of the expansive
role of social control in Western society, see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 28 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977) (contemplating “power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them
by turning them into objects of knowledge”).
80
See Karon et al., supra note 48, at 1067 (reporting that HIV is concentrated in populations such as racial and
ethnic minorities, women, and the poor, which are groups who have historically experienced low access to health
services and whose poor access has made it harder to employ effective HIV prevention). Additionally, surveillance
efforts have failed to adequately track certain high-risk groups, including sex workers and detainees. See Curran et
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Distrust and elements of punishment have permeated the United States’ response to the
AIDS crisis. Since the beginning of the pandemic, HIV stigma has coalesced with advocates’
calls for specially tailored policies to confront the disease, which has contributed to HIV
exceptionalism and encouraged the allocation of HIV-specific resources and processes outside
the realm of typical disease control.81 Lawmakers’ opinions about HIV policy have divided
along political fault lines. Although HIV advocates have eschewed partner notification regimes
and the expansion of universal testing programs, conservatives have expressed profound
disapproval for empirically supported82 prevention strategies like syringe exchange programs and
less-stigmatizing,83 more comprehensive sexuality education.84 Accordingly, individuals living
with HIV were barred from entering the United States in 1987 for over two decades and
Congress prohibited the use of federal funds for syringe exchange programs in 1988—a
prohibition that remains in effect.85
Despite HIV’s grossly disproportionate, devastating impact on black Americans and men
who have sex with men,86 policymakers passed emergency AIDS relief legislation after a white
child named Ryan White garnered their attention and interest.87 Ryan was a boy living with
hemophilia and AIDS who became a symbol of HIV stigma88 after being banned from school in
1985 on the basis of his HIV status.89 A few months after Ryan’s death in April 1990, Congress
passed the Ryan White CARE Act to provide states with federal relief to address HIV treatment

al., supra note 52, at 613 (“Relatively few data are available from studies of male or female prostitutes or
incarcerated persons.”).
81
See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Applying Public Health Principles to the HIV Epidemic, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2397, 2397 (2005) (attributing advocacy for HIV exceptionalism—as signified by “special resources and increased
funding and . . . the application of standard methods of disease control”—to early responses, including violence, the
notion that AIDS is a form of retribution, and proposals for quarantine and mandatory tattooing).
82
See Fauci, supra note 38, at 1048 (cataloguing approaches to HIV prevention that researchers have found to be
effective, including “education and behavior modification, the promotion and provision of condoms, the treatment of
other sexually transmitted diseases, drug-abuse treatment (for example, methadone maintenance for injection-drug
users), access to clean needles and syringes for injection-drug users, and the use of antiretroviral drugs to interrupt
transmission of the virus from mother to infant”).
83
See Shatz, supra note 40, at 528 (“Abstinence-only education teaches that sex can properly occur only between a
man and a woman within the confines of marriages; it condemns homosexual sex of any kind, since gays and
lesbians currently can marry in only one state.”) For a more detailed analysis of the stigmatizing effects of
abstinence-only education on parents and young people living with HIV, see RACHAEL D. DOMBROWSKI & DIANA
K. BRUCE, AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, IN A POSITION TO KNOW: YOUTH AND PARENTS
LIVING WITH HIV SPEAK OUT ON SEXUALITY EDUCATION (2008), available at http://www.aidsalliance.org/policy/positiveyouthproject/positive-youth-report.pdf.
84
See Frieden et al., supra note 81, at 2397 (addressing the political costs of moving past HIV exceptionalism by
taking a more traditional disease-control approach and identifying members of both political sides who could be
offended: “conservatives who oppose the implementation of effective prevention programs, including syringe
exchange and the widespread availability of condoms, and some HIV activists who oppose expansion of testing,
notification of partners of infected person . . . and what some see as inappropriate ‘medicalization’ of the response to
the epidemic”).
85
Greene, supra note 74, at S96.
86
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
87
Greene, supra note 74, at S96.
88
See Patricia D. Siplon, Washington’s Response to the AIDS Epidemic: The Ryan White CARE Act, 27 POL’Y
STUD. J. 796, 796 (1999) (observing that Ryan White became “a powerful symbol of discrimination and obstacles
faced by people with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome”).
89
Greene, supra note 74, at S95.
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and prevention.90 Congress generally intended the legislation to deliver aid to the most affected
areas of the United States,91 although it has been interpreted as the payer of last resort in meeting
the demands of the AIDS crisis.92
This groundbreaking law, which has evolved greatly over the course of subsequent
reauthorizations, was a complex response to the pandemic. In brief, Title I of the Ryan White
CARE Act provided disaster relief directly to the hardest hit areas of the United States, Title II
granted funds to every state, and Title III funded proposals from community entities to foster
early intervention.93 However, Title IV—the legislative carve-out for women, youth, and
children—was unfunded for fiscal years 1991 through 1993 and functioned purely as a
legislative memorial to Ryan, suggesting that Congress believed that the populations most in
need of HIV relief were not those after whom they had branded their flagship relief effort.94
Moreover, in line with recommendations from Reagan’s Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus,95 the Act originally featured a mandate for state laws to criminalize the
transmission of HIV.96
The Ryan White CARE Act gave money to states and communities rather than directly to
individuals living with HIV. Consumers of HIV services have frequently lacked control over the
health policy decisions that have shaped their lives. Individuals living with HIV have advised
their providers about administering health services but have not directly assumed the role of
decision maker,97 although some degree of consumer involvement has become necessary to
90

Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576
(1990). Previously, the deaths of a mother named Elizabeth Glaser living with hemophilia who had contracted HIV
through blood products and her perinatally infected daughter galvanized research efforts and resulted in the
formation of the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation. See Greene, supra note 74, at S94 (recalling how
numerous new infections arose in the early and mid-1980s due to American blood banks’ inability to test for HIV
and refusal to screen for imperfect surrogate markers such as Hepatitis B, and conveying how the deaths of
Elizabeth and Ariel Glaser caused an outcry for improved research as well as formation of the Elizabeth Glaser
Pediatric AIDS Foundation).
91
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576
(1990).
92
See Erika G. Martin et al., Faction, Fiction, and Fairness: Resource Allocation Under the Ryan White CARE Act,
25 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103 (2006) (observing that although the original legislation stated Congress intended to
provide resources to those areas with the greatest HIV/AIDS burden, “[p]ulling in another direction is the principle
that the RWCA should serve effectively (although not legally) as a ‘payer of last resort’”).
93
For a more detailed analysis of the initial Ryan White CARE Act legislation, see Siplon, supra note 88, at 799802 (explaining that Title I funded metropolitan areas hardest hit by the epidemic, Title II funded every state based
on cumulative caseloads and fiscal capacities, and Title III funded individual proposals made by public and
nonprofit organizations to facilitate early intervention).
94
See id. at 802 (“Title IV was destined to be the least important provision of the Act, and in fact was not funded
during Fiscal Years 1991-93.”).
95
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 131 (1988), available at
http://www.archive.org/download/reportofpresiden00pres/reportofpresiden00pres.pdf.
96
See Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act § 101, Pub. L. No.101-381, § 2647, 104 Stat.
576, 603 (1990) (conditioning federal funds on state criminalization of the intentional transmission of HIV or a state
evincing that it possessed a preexisting statutory framework to prosecute individuals for intentionally transmitting
HIV).
97
See P. Meyer, Consumer Representation in Multi-Site HIV, Mental Health, and Substance Abuse Research: The
HIV/AIDS Treatment Adherence, Health Outcomes and Cost Study, 16 AIDS CARE S137, S138 (2004) (noting that
consumer advisory boards have acted in an advisory capacity in the HIV/AIDS field since 1985, although they have
not served a decision-making function).
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receive government grants for HIV research and treatment.98 Administrators have struggled to
include consumers in planning and service provision while regularly questioning the necessary
extent of consumers’ control and limiting consumer selection to those with whom administrators
were most familiar.99 Yet, meaningful input from consumers is widely considered advantageous
to the success of HIV treatment and research in terms of maintaining cultural appropriateness,
building trust, ensuring that service providers and researchers are responsive to the populations
they serve, and improving the lives of the consumers themselves—for whom HIV treatment and
research are conducted in the first place.100
B. A NEW APPROACH TO SURVIVING AIDS
Despite such dire stakes, the United States’ government has often been too preoccupied
with ideological judgments to provide a measured response to the AIDS pandemic. One of a
great many examples arose when American officials participated in international relief efforts
during the beginning of the twenty-first century and advocated for the removal of language about
harm reduction—a concept that was too far removed from the country’s abstinence-only
approach to sex and drug use.101 In the process, the Bush Administration and its allies espoused
ideology over evidence in formulating international AIDS policy.102 Beyond its impact on HIV
incidence, the United States’ abstinence-only approach to HIV prevention further alienated the
country on the international stage during the Iraq War.103
Still, hope has always remained for a more successful, internationally acceptable,
evidence-based response. The Obama Administration has represented a radical shift in
American AIDS policy, and its National HIV/AIDS Strategy emblematized the government’s
new awareness of HIV stigma.104 Now, policymakers in the United States must harness the antistigma message while moving forward with a comprehensive, multi-sectorial approach to
addressing HIV.105

98

See id. (observing that federal agencies such as the Health Resources and Services Administration and the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration mandate consumer involvement in the application
process and through advisory boards while Ryan White Planning Councils similarly foster consumer participation).
99
See id. at S139 (explaining that administrators struggle to involve consumers, question how much power
consumer advisory boards should have, and often select their favorite consumers for representative roles).
100
See id. at S138-39 (reviewing literature on consumer involvement and finding that consumer representation
benefited services and research as well as consumers in numerous ways, and advantages of consumer involvement
included maintaining cultural awareness, establishing trust, informing researchers and providers about the changing
needs of the community, and empowering consumers to become better leaders and professionals).
101
See Wodak, supra note 32, at 2 (describing the United States’ efforts to remove the phrases “harm reduction” and
“needle syringe programmes” from a prevention policy paper by the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS).
102
See id. at 1–3 (discussing how the United States’ anomalous international AIDS policies increased since the
election of President George W. Bush, recalling that only six of the thirty-five individuals from the United States’
War on Drugs organizations that advocated against needle exchange programs had medical degrees, and detailing
the ways in which the United States’ approach to HIV and substance abuse prevention have differed from the
approaches of other developed countries).
103
See id. at 1, 3 (arguing that the United States had become increasingly isolated and observing that “[f]ixing ‘the
intelligence and facts on the policy’ has trapped the United States of America into a military quagmire in Iraq and
contributed to looming economic problems” while “[f]ixing ‘the intelligence and facts on the policy’ for illicit drugs
. . . ensured tragic health, social and economic consequences for the United States of America”).
104
See infra Part II.B.1.
105
See infra Part II.B.2.
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1. THE NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY
The Strategy took shape during various interactions between the White House Office of
National AIDS Policy (ONAP) and strategic stakeholders throughout the United States.106
ONAP hosted fourteen town hall discussions with thousands of Americans, conducted a number
of topic-specific meetings among HIV experts, and worked with governmental and community
entities to organize additional outreach events.107 ONAP continuously involved individuals
living with HIV in light of the understanding described by President Obama that “[p]eople living
with HIV have transformed how we engage community members in setting policy, conducting
research, and providing services.”108
The Strategy set priorities rather than deliver an exhaustive list of needed changes for
domestic AIDS policy.109 It embraced three primary goals: reduce the number of individuals
becoming infected, improve access to care and the health of individuals living with HIV, and
reduce HIV-related health disparities.110 The Strategy clearly prioritized the lives of individuals
living with HIV by designating their improved access to care and better health as one of the
Strategy’s three central goals.111 In addition, it maintained a focus on individuals already living
with HIV by giving priority to eliminating Americans’ common misperceptions about the risk
for HIV transmission through casual contact,112 acknowledging the history of poor health care
that many people living with HIV have experienced,113 and promoting new services that respond
to the diverse beliefs, practices, and cultures of patients.114 The Strategy did not rely on the
symbol of a white child to elicit compassion for individuals living with HIV; it asked for the
United States to reorient its efforts around those groups at highest risk for HIV infection: men
who have sex with men, black men and women, Latinos and Latinas, and drug users.115
The Strategy’s implementation guide recognized the social mistreatment of people living
with HIV in explicit language:
Addressing ongoing stigma and discrimination is perhaps the biggest challenge
we face, as this is not about what government does as much as it is about
changing hearts and minds among members of the public. At the same time, three
decades of experience tell us that essential starting points for addressing stigma
and discrimination include maintaining a commitment to civil rights enforcement,
working to ensure that public policies are grounded in best public health practices,
106

NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 3.
Id.
108
Letter from Barrack Obama (July 13, 2010), in NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE U.S., supra note 27.
109
NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE U.S., supra note 27, at 3 (“This document provides a roadmap to move the
Nation forward in responding to the domestic HIV epidemic. It is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all
activities needed to address HIV/AIDS in the United States, but is intended to be a concise plan that identifies a set
of priorities and strategic action steps tied to measurable outcomes.”).
110
Id. at 1.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 19.
113
Id. at 26. The Strategy offered examples of this history of poor health care such as historically supported mistrust
of the medical establishment among black Americans, heterosexual health care providers feeling too uncomfortable
to ask about the sexual history of sexual minorities when doing so was appropriate, and the particular challenge
faced by transgender individuals to find providers who respect them and with whom they can have honest
discussions about hormone use. Id.
114
Id. at 26.
115
Id. at 11. Further, the Strategy emphasizes that many members in these groups do not engage in riskier behaviors
than individuals in other populations. Id. at 12.
107
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and supporting people living with HIV to disclose their status and promote the
public leadership of community members living with HIV.116
In general, the Strategy moved beyond broad gestures of support to adapt old approaches
to evolving, evidence-based advances in health policy.117 Thus, after acknowledging the
challenge of addressing HIV stigma, the Strategy proposed meaningful changes to the policy
landscape by conveying new caution about statutes that criminalize HIV,118 prioritizing the
investigation of discrimination claims made by people living with HIV,119 asking the Department
of Justice to scrutinize HIV-specific sentencing laws,120 and demanding the improved
enforcement of civil rights laws.121 In addition, the Strategy called for governmental and
community stakeholders to work together to ensure people living with HIV are empowered as
leaders122—a far cry from twenty-five years prior when President Reagan called children living
with AIDS “that problem.”123
2. HARNESSING THE STRATEGY IN POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW
The Strategy’s anti-stigma message should extend to other important opportunities for
improvement, including the integration of HIV care across the spectrum of health services,
criminal justice reform, and the grant of substantive decision-making power to individuals living
with HIV. While much improved, the struggle against stigma for individuals living with HIV
continues and the fight to end AIDS is not yet won. Heightened stigmatization is linked to
increased levels of fear and anxiety among people living with HIV, which obstructs HIV
prevention and improved health.124 Accordingly, confronting and eliminating HIV stigma is not
only a matter of social justice; it is wholly necessary to all levels of an effective health relief
effort.125
Reform to meet today’s pandemic must integrate HIV prevention, care, and treatment
into various other areas of health policy rather than continue to separate HIV from other health
116

NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 23.
See Gregorio A. Millet et al., A Way Forward: The National HIV/AIDS Strategy and Reducing HIV Incidence in
the United States, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME S144, S146 (2010) (claiming that “the
innovation of the national strategy lies in its commitment to building on an evolving evidence base of what works, in
identifying common national goals toward which federal, state, local, and tribal governmental partners and
community partners can align their efforts, and in a renewed commitment to collaboration and coordination”).
118
NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 26 (“State legislatures should
consider reviewing HIV-specific criminal statutes to ensure that they are consistent with current knowledge of HIV
transmission and support public health approaches to screening for, preventing and treating HIV.”).
119
Id. (“DOJ, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs, and HUD’s Fair Housing Enforcement Office will prioritize and fast track investigations of
discrimination charges involving HIV, as necessary and appropriate under relevant statutes, and consider additional
policies to prevent discrimination from occurring.”).
120
Id. (“DOJ will examine and report on HIV-specific sentencing laws and implications for people living with
HIV.”).
121
Id. (“The Department of Justice and other Federal agencies must enhance cooperation to facilitate enforcement of
Federal antidiscrimination laws.”).
122
Id. at 25 (“Governments and other institutions . . . should work with . . . AIDS coalitions, HIV services
organizations, and other institutions to actively promote public leadership by people living with HIV.”).
123
See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
124
See Malcolm et al., supra note 36, at 350 (explaining that fear and anxiety remain high among individuals
diagnosed with HIV and who experience negative responses toward people living with the virus and that they
become afraid to reveal their status to others).
125
See id. at 348 (claiming that the “epidemic of fear, stigmatization and discrimination” that has accompanied HIV
“has posed a challenge to those who are concerned about providing not only an effective response to HIV/AIDS but
also a humane one, based on a concern for human rights and the principles of social justice”).
117
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and social issues. Over the course of the pandemic, support for HIV exceptionalism has
waned.126 The isolation of HIV services from other medical interventions is particularly
problematic in the modern era because, as the number of individuals living with HIV in the
United States increases each year, the funding for HIV initiatives decreases, perpetuating the
cycle of poor prevention, undiagnosed incidence, and heightened prevalence.127
Every institution must question to what extent its work contributes to HIV
stigmatization.128 For instance, when state and federal legislators pass statutes to outlaw HIV
transmission, they perpetuate HIV stigma rather than meaningfully working toward ending the
HIV pandemic. Criminalizing transmission does not call upon the uninfected to engage in safer
behaviors and unfairly assigns responsibility for stemming the spread of HIV solely to those
already living with the virus.129 Most individuals living with HIV already express a sense of
duty to disclose their diagnosis to their sexual partners, but individuals who are unaware of their
status are those most likely to infect others.130 Therefore, statutes that criminalize infection
contribute to stigma and reinforce HIV exceptionalism, consequently failing to promote
prevention of the spread of HIV, which depends on increased diagnosis and care for individuals
who may not know they are infected.131
Adequate reform requires changes to existing policy and laws that have a
disproportionately negative effect across vulnerable populations. For example, drug control laws
have a disparate racial impact.132 In turn, incarceration leads to increased risk for HIV infection
as well as greater institutional distrust. Thus, altered drug control laws should delimit their
negative impact on public health.133 Moreover, stigma must be addressed across the entire policy
landscape. Just as an improved response to stigma within the realm of HIV policy could benefit
126

See Ronald Bayer & Claire Edington, HIV Testing, Human Rights, and Global AIDS Policy: Exceptionalism and
Its Discontents, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 301, 320 (2009) (“If at the moment of its emergence the
exceptionalist perspective had provided an almost universally accepted understanding of what the new global threat
to health required, twenty years later, in the face of changing therapeutic prospects and of a vast pandemic burden,
the earlier view no longer commanded such allegiance.”).
127
See H. Irene Hall et al., Estimated Future HIV Prevalence, Incidence, and Potential Infections Averted in the
United States: A Multiple Scenario Analysis, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 271, 271 (2010)
(observing that reductions to state and local allocations for HIV services and the growing number of individuals in
need “raise questions about the feasibility of continuing to reduce the HIV transmission rate in the United States
without further expanding and improving the efficiency and impact of HIV prevention and treatment”).
128
See Mill et al., supra note 77, at 1480 (concluding that health care providers and institutions must evaluate
policies and determine how to best meet individuals’ needs in light of “the underlying social inequalities
experienced by clients with HIV, and in particular those with layered stigma and those who have experienced social
oppression”).
129
See Klemm, supra note 42, at 512 (noting various problems that arise from criminalizing the transmission of
HIV, including the disproportionate impact of such statutes on men who have sex with men, mistakenly limiting
HIV prevention to only the HIV-positive, and diminishing the public health message that individuals share
responsibility for their sexual health).
130
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
131
See Klemm, supra note 42, at 511–12 (stating that research indicates that the majority of those living with HIV
feel a duty to disclose, criminal enforcement of this duty amplifies stigma, and HIV is the only sexually transmitted
infection that states have chosen to criminalize to such a great extent even though similarly transmitted infections
have grave consequences).
132
See Cari Cason et al., The Impact of Laws on HIV and STD Prevention, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 139, 144 (2002)
(“Substantial evidence demonstrates that drug control laws, as currently defined and enforced, have racially
disparate impacts.”).
133
See id. (explaining how higher incarceration rates contribute to increased HIV risk due to poor drug treatment
and risky sexual behaviors in prisons).
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disproportionately affected populations in other realms of their lives, an effective response to
stigma across layers of governance could similarly improve the social power and health
resources of individuals living with HIV.134
Individuals personally affected by and living with HIV can and should make decisions
about the policies designed to help them. HIV-diagnosed individuals already work to shape and
control the social implications of their health by facing the daily task of participating in or
abstaining from the public identification of their status, and their providers should harness this
inevitability when engaging consumers of HIV services rather than ignore or fear it.135 Existing
challenges to consumer involvement could be overcome if consumers were invited to
confidentially or openly work with researchers and service providers at the inception of their
initiatives, if every level within organizations committed to the implementation of consumer
involvement programs, and if researchers and service providers made special efforts to
acknowledge the power differential between staff members and consumers.136 Additionally,
because stigma materializes within particular social and historical contexts,137 individuals living
with HIV are best situated to adequately respond to stigma across their diverse cultural
backgrounds.138 The empowerment of individuals living with HIV to make policy decisions
directly counteracts the devaluing function of HIV stigma, improving prevention and treatment
outcomes.139
III. LESSONS FROM A PLAGUE
While these reforms are generally characterized by integrating HIV into the American
response to other social and health issues, AIDS advocates have continuously and
unapologetically employed tactics outside mainstream political discourse to raise HIV-specific
awareness. As an example, on November 27, 2012, activists protested potential budget cuts to
AIDS funding stemming from fiscal cliff negotiations.140 Fifty activists—many living with
HIV—traveled to House Speaker John Boehner’s congressional office.141 Four women and three
men entered the office in the middle of the work day and removed their clothing, revealing handpainted slogans on their naked bodies such as “AIDS Cuts Kill” and “Fund HOPWA,”142 the
134

See Mill et al., supra note 77, at 1478 (discussing findings that adequate responses to HIV stigma could mitigate
inequities by promoting empowerment and political activism among marginalized communities).
135
See id. at 1479 (“Persons living with HIV and AIDS attempted to take control of their respective situation as a
strategy to manage stigma. The process of balancing decisions about disclosure with the need for secrecy is an
example of PHAs exerting social control.”).
136
See Meyer, supra note 97, at S140 (describing several recommendations to overcome the challenges of consumer
involvement, including early involvement in initiatives, committing to involvement across different levels of the
organization, and acknowledging power differentials).
137
See Parker & Aggleton, supra note 79, at 17 (“It is vitally important to recognize that stigma arises and
stigmatization takes shape in specific contexts of culture and power. Stigma always has a history which influences
when it appears and the form it takes.”).
138
See id. at 14 (“Much of what has been written about stigma and discrimination in the context of HIV and AIDS
has emphasized the complexity of these phenomena, and has attributed our inability to respond to them more
effectively to both their complex nature and their high degree of diversity in different cultural settings.”).
139
See id. (explaining that “stigma, understood as a negative attribute, is mapped onto people, who in turn by virtue
of their difference, are understood to be negatively valued in society”).
140
Peter Hermann, AIDS Activists Arrested After Stripping in House Speaker’s Office, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/aids-activists-arrested-after-stripping-in-housespeakers-office/.
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Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS program.143 The nude demonstrators, along with
dozens of clothed protesters, chanted: “People with AIDS are under attack! What do we do?
Fight back!”144 A protest organizer explained, “[w]e wanted to strip away the rhetoric of the
fiscal cliff.”145 In the midst of politically charged fiscal cliff negotiations, “we’re concerned that
real lives left in the balance will be lost,” leading AIDS advocates to believe “we should do
something outrageous to get our message across.”146 The fiscal cliff cuts were ultimately
averted, but, as one protester living with HIV observed, “just the idea of these programs being
cut is horrible.”147 Another explained, “we need to make sure they stop going after people with
AIDS.”148
The protesters in Speaker Boehner’s office were contemporary participants in a powerful
legacy of AIDS activism through which advocates have recognized the American government’s
growing role as a regulator and problem solver and rejected the government’s discriminatory
neglect.149 As President Obama acknowledged in his introduction to the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy, this legacy transformed how the government “engage[s] community members in setting
policy, conducting research, and providing services.”150 In the process, AIDS advocacy
consumed the social movement of sexual minorities in the United States, inciting an aggressive
defense of difference rather than a continued push toward integration.151 The influence of AIDS
advocacy over sexual minorities has waned. As HIV stigma has been gradually extricated from
sexual minority status, movement elites—those with the greatest resources and representation in
existing power structures and for whom assimilation is typically easiest and most beneficial—
have embraced an integrationist agenda that does too little for more marginalized sexual
minorities, like transgender and non-whites individuals.152 The earlier response to the AIDS
crisis revealed the potential for sexual minorities to represent a broader coalition of needs than
those within its current focus.153 Informed by the lessons of the AIDS crisis, sexual minorities
143
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For a contemporary examination of the importance of remembering lessons from the AIDS crisis rooted in
sociological theory, see DEBORAH B. GOULD, MOVING POLITICS: EMOTION AND ACT UP’S FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 45
(2009).
What we lose if the history of AIDS activism in this country is forgotten is the memory of a
government of a wealthy, ostensibly democratic country unmoved by the deaths of hundreds,
thousands, and finally hundreds of thousands of its own inhabitants, largely because the
overwhelming majority of them were gay and bisexual men, and the others were seen as similarly
expendable: drug users as well as poor men and women, a disproportionate number of whom were
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should adapt their advocacy agenda to better understand and prioritize the consequences of
differences outside as well as within their movement.154
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF LIBERATION
Although AIDS was a cross-cutting issue disproportionately affecting some but not all
members of certain marginalized groups,155 medical experts implicated all sexual minorities
early in the AIDS crisis by labeling the syndrome’s symptoms “gay-related immune
deficiency.”156 The mainstream press followed suit, reporting on “gay-related immune
deficiency” but ignoring what would become known as acquired immune deficiency syndrome
for long periods except to leverage the American epidemic to broadcast homophobia.157
Unsurprisingly, the AIDS crisis fundamentally transformed the social movement of sexual
minorities in the United States, emboldening a nationwide, liberationist approach to identitybased activism.158 As HIV has gradually mainstreamed, integrationist priorities have reclaimed
sexual minorities, allowing movement elites to ignore smaller minorities within their group for
whom marriage equality does not take priority.159
1. LIBERATION SAVED LIVES
In the wake of the initial AIDS crisis, advocates for sexual minorities fell into two
predominant camps: one was an integrationist, centrist collection that endeavored for marriage
and additional heterosexual privileges while the other, liberationist crowd pushed for sexual
liberty and the deregulation of sexuality.160 Even though some members of each camp viewed
AIDS as a distraction, both liberationists and integrationists were eventually forced to recognize
that any political agenda must address AIDS.161 According to activist Simon Watney, “AIDS is
black and Latino/a. We are at risk of losing as well the history of lesbian/gay/queer collective
political resistance in the face of the government’s aggressive indifference, extreme negligence,
and punitive policies regarding AIDS.
Id.
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See generally Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 13 (2004) (“Gay centrism
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not only a medical crisis on an unparalleled scale, it involves a crisis of representation itself, a
crisis over the entire framing of knowledge about the human body and its capacities for sexual
pleasure.”162
In light of mass death, egregious homophobia, and government inaction, the
premeditation required to tailor advocacy agendas to an integrationist or liberationist perspective
soon became an indefensible luxury.163 And without measured tailoring, AIDS quickly resulted
in a series of mobilization moments during which liberationists dominated the sexual minority
movement.164 After initial state inaction, sexual minorities leveraged the tenets of its past
liberation movement to convey sexually explicit HIV prevention messages, saving lives while
publicly embracing the political dimensions of sexuality.165 Advocates rejected individual
solutions and instead called for an outright end to subjugation, connecting AIDS to oppression
and survival to systemic transformation.166 AIDS advocates forced the public to contemplate
sexuality when the government sought to ignore it,167 and feminist men and women passionately
litigated the meanings and practices of health and liberation.168
During the various mobilization moments of the AIDS crisis, the AIDS Coalition to
Unleash Power (ACT UP) demonstrated the advantages and especially the inclusiveness of
liberation over integration. In 1987, when the existing American status regime took a businessas-usual approach to AIDS, ACT UP emerged from communities of sexual minorities in New
York City and quickly spread throughout the United States.169 ACT UP merged education and
social protest to provoke public awareness, increase funding for HIV initiatives, open the rolls of
experimental research trials, and improve the accessibility of HIV treatment.170 Its sex-positive,
Id.

162

Id. at 9.
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(Douglas Crimp ed., 1987) (describing AIDS in the United States in 1987, including reactionary homophobia and
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“suggested that lesbians and gay men needed to see their collective health as a political problem,” echoed the
liberation movement, and, “[b]y rejecting individual solutions and instead calling for the end to ‘straight’
oppression, Patton imagined a response to AIDS that would reinvigorate gays and lesbians in a struggle for more
systemic liberation”).
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See id. at 1 (“People reacting to the emergent AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s inserted sexuality into the public
sphere at a moment when the state did everything it could to avoid the subject.”).
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See id. at 14 (observing that feminist “gays and lesbians who had lived through the liberation movement of the
1970s participated in a vociferous debate about the meanings and practices of health and liberation as well as the
role gender politics might play in that discussion”).
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GOULD, supra note 153, at 4.
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See Brett C. Stockdill, ACT-UP, in PROTEST, POWER, AND CHANGE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
FROM ACT-UP TO WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 10 (Roger Powers et al. eds., 1997) (“ACT-UP’s combination of
provocative education and social protest has been integral in raising awareness about HIV and AIDS in the gay and
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unapologetic methods challenged mainstream and minority conceptualizations of sexuality.171
As sociologist and former ACT UP member Deborah Gould explained, “ACT UP queers opened
up ways of being gay and of being political that had been foreclosed by the more mainstreamoriented lesbian and gay establishment, paving the way for new identity and political formations
among sexual and gender outlaws of all ages.”172
ACT UP targeted disparaging social attitudes toward sexual minorities and people living
with HIV and reacted with public displays of unapologetic sexuality.173 For example, to dispel
misperceptions about HIV transmission and sexual minorities, ACT UP placed numerous posters
on city buses in San Francisco and New York City modeled after a United Colors of Benetton
fashion advertisement.174 The poster depicted heterosexual and same-sex men and women in
interracial combinations kissing, with the declaration: “Kissing doesn’t kill. Greed and
indifference do.”175 In doing so, ACT UP rejected the notion that HIV can be transmitted
through kissing while redirecting blame for the virus away from sexual minorities and toward the
failure of society to respond to the AIDS crisis.176 ACT UP also regularly engaged in kiss-ins at
the end of the 1980s, highlighting the homophobic response to AIDS through massive
demonstrations of same-sex intimacy.177 A fact sheet distributed at a kiss-in in 1988 explained,
“we kiss as an affirmation of our feelings, our desires, ourselves.”178
If the existing normative regime defended inaction, ACT UP and partner groups
intervened, forcing the Food and Drug Administration to speed up the drug-approval process and
securing space for people living with HIV in government and corporate decision-making.179
Activists fought for the most marginalized members of their coalitions, pushing the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to expand AIDS-defining illnesses to include those infections
and diseases commonly occurring in HIV-infected women and the poor.180 They also advocated
for protecting drug users through the proliferation of politically unpopular needle exchange
programs, and they demanded greater attention to all the diverse populations experiencing AIDS,
including an enhanced focus on women and non-white populations.181
2. THE RETURN TO INTEGRATION
Of course, AIDS activism in the United States was never the exclusive province of sexual
minorities and their allies; this became increasingly true as a greater proportion of women were
infected and heterosexual contact was more publicly recognized for its potential to transmit

lesbian community and broader society, increasing government AIDS budgets, opening up experimental trials, and
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HIV.182 ACT UP, which had always defined itself as an inclusive organization since springing
from communities of sexual minorities in the 1980s, attracted an increasing number of
heterosexuals as HIV more deeply affected different heterosexual populations.183 When the
virus spread, HIV stigma lessened,184 and integrationist priorities dominated the social
movement of sexual minorities. Today’s movement is propelled by the public performance of
respectability.185 With enough progress to ignore the life-ending consequences of being different
that characterized the earlier AIDS crisis, the movement of sexual minorities has recast itself as
an asexual, apolitical counterpart to the heterosexual middle class.186 Thus, the movement
avoids discrimination by downplaying difference,187 which mutes rather than defends the
identities of various individuals within movement subgroups.188
Specifically, the push for marriage equality has narrowed the focus of advocacy
efforts.189 This preoccupation with marriage is the direct result of movement elites seeking to
moderate goals around consensus issues.190 After the initial, harrowing years of the AIDS crisis,
the movement has formalized and professionalized,191 becoming more respectable without
asking for more respect for difference.192 Beyond having a potential castigatory effect on the
unmarried,193 the focus on marriage has created a political ideology in which liberationist
priorities, such as the deregulation of sexuality and gender, cannot coexist without sacrificing
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movement legitimacy and coherence.194 To echo queer theorist Michal Warner’s famous critique
of marriage, the movement has itself become an institution “that is designed both to reward those
inside it and discipline those outside it.”195
Undoubtedly, most sexual minorities have recently benefited from positive cultural, legal,
and policy developments, including the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,196 the election of the
first openly bisexual member to Congress,197 and several breakthroughs on marriage.198
Although typically less publicized than these progressions, numerous disappointments have also
surfaced, such as the failed reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, which
eventually extended vital new protections to sexual minorities.199 Underreported failures have
often hit more marginalized sexual minorities harder than movement elites. For example,
transgender individuals—rendered invisible by integrationist priorities200—are particularly
vulnerable to intimate partner violence but have historically experienced neglect from the
feminist movement, which has produced most of the resources currently available to abuse
survivors.201 While far from a magic bullet against intimate partner violence for transgender
individuals, the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act improved access to shelters
and other services that are vital to transgender survivors of abuse.202
The integrationist approach is not helpful to a large segment of the movement.
Compared to their white counterparts, black sexual minorities have experienced dramatically
194
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fewer improvements to their quality of life over the last decade despite the widespread
perception of social advancement for all, suggesting, as the Center for American Progress has
pointed out, that “some of the gay headline policy priorities that garnered the most research,
analysis, and advocacy—such as marriage equality—under-serve this population when taken
alone.”203 Marriage is especially likely to empower white, male, middle-class sexual minorities,
but its advantages for other movement constituents are not clear.204 The embrace of marriage
equality as a central priority funnels resources away from causes that benefit the less traditionally
elite,205 rewarding sexual minorities for distinguishing themselves from more marginalized
populations and undermining movement solidarity in an era of tremendous opportunity for
across-the-board progress.206
B. MOBILIZING FOR AN INCLUSIVE AGENDA
Modern identity-based social movements have a different goal than past social
movements. While the labor movement sought the reallocation of economic rights and
entitlements and the temperance and purity movements engaged morality politics to change
private and public practices, identity-based social movements have fought for status.207 The
women’s movement, for example, asked society to recognize women as equal citizens to men
and, as a consequence of this status, deserving of control over their own reproductive
processes.208 Sexual minorities have the power to drive law toward justice for all of its
constituents. The movement’s underlying goal should not be a redistribution of power but rather
the transformation of society’s valuation of nonconforming sexual and gender identities;
heterosexual privilege does not stem from the power to marry but the societal understanding of
heterosexuals as social authorities.209
Similar to the approach needed to improve the American response to HIV,210 sexual
minorities should refocus the movement’s agenda on meeting the needs of all sexual minorities
at every level of law and policy. Unlike the need in the HIV context to increase integration into
other social and legal issues,211 it is vital for sexual minorities to highlight their differences and
not mask themselves as homogeneous counterparts to the heterosexual middle class.212 The early
AIDS epidemic showed that integration did not keep sexual minorities alive in times of crisis,213
and wholesale integration would ensure society’s continued neglect of sexual minorities’ distinct
203
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needs. Rather than cover up inconsistencies with heterosexuals, sexual minorities should hold to
their differences and demand respect for them.
As an illustration of this approach, potential reformation of public education provides an
array of advocacy issues that deserve prioritization. Conversations about HIV and sexual
minorities have been paired in school settings as matters of public health, but acknowledgement
of sexual minorities in the course of public education remains rare.214 Abstinence-only education
programs ignore or spread lies about the efficacy of condom use, teach young people that sex is
unhealthy outside of marriage, and ignore or condemn sexual minorities.215 Although the Obama
Administration initially acted to shift funding away from abstinence-only approaches and toward
evidence-based, comprehensive sexuality education, compromises made during health care
reform funneled new funds into abstinence-only programs.216 These programs universally
stigmatize non-heterosexuals and are therefore problematic for all sexual minorities,
broadcasting heterosexual intimacy as “normal,” institutionalizing heteronormativity,217 and
increasing young sexual minorities’ risk for depression, substance abuse, and homelessness.218
These programs also perpetuate health issues such as increasing rates of gonorrhea and
heightened risk for Hepatitis B, which are less pressing for heterosexuals than sexual
minorities.219 Other education reforms with generally inclusive significance for sexual
minorities include school safety policies and anti-bullying initiatives,220 improved research into
school administrators’ disparate treatment of sexual minority youth,221 and reevaluating zerotolerance policies that result in harsh punishments for sexual minority students when they react
214
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to identity-based harassment.222 These issues call upon advocates to highlight and defend how
sexual minorities differ from heterosexuals. As a result, efforts are concentrated on laws and
policies that affect virtually every movement constituent and that uniformly promote their value
as unique participants in society.
Tactics for achieving these and similarly inclusive advocacy goals should reflect the
animating philosophy of AIDS activism insofar as these efforts should unapologetically serve the
needs of as many movement constituents as possible. Moreover, the movement should refocus
rather than reset the existing advocacy machinery for sexual minorities in the United States,
which has reaped many recent benefits, especially for movement elites but also for others.223
The various strategies advocates have used to garner increased support for marriage equality
have, undeniably, produced results. For example, the American Foundation for Equal Rights
(AFER) has tapped cultural, political, business, and legal elites and channeled the philanthropic
endeavors of celebrities, corporations, conservatives, liberals, and moderates to foster marriage
equality. 224 In the process, it has recruited big firms and high-profile lawyers to advocate for
marriage equality in courtrooms, law schools, and media outlets across the country.225 These
efforts improved attitudes toward sexual minorities even though shifting opinions could not
alone produce concrete results for all movement constituents.226
Rather than abandon past work, the resources garnered and lessons learned in the name of
marriage equality should be leveraged toward more liberationist ends. Of course, not every
liberationist goal will enjoy the same elite support that marriage equality has, but certain more
universally beneficial issues, such as education reform, could be just as palatable as marriage
equality was when AFER first began incorporating elites to build its coalition. The movement of
sexual minorities need not unify under a single banner, and different advocates may champion
distinct issues with varying degrees of integrationist support.227 At the same time, however, the
movement should eschew the rhetoric of respectability and work toward progress without
denying or wavering in the protection of internal and external differences.228
Finally, although organizations like ACT UP sought to serve diverse constituencies by
expanding their membership base,229 simply redistributing representation in sexual minority
advocacy coalitions is not enough. Just as integrationists have failed to represent the needs of all
sexual minorities, a more liberationist group of advocates from traditionally non-elite
backgrounds could not singlehandedly forge laws and policies that adequately serve movement
constituents across the entire United States—particularly if new representatives are selected by
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movement elites based on their harmony with existing motives.230 Future efforts should respond
to the absence of information about the sexual minorities that have been the least visible in
advocacy efforts. 231 The movement for sexual minorities should reject stereotypes and political
deal making in place of comprehensive data collection about underrepresented populations and
prioritize the empirical realities of their stakeholders.232
IV. CONCLUSION
Improving the lives of sexual minorities along with other populations disproportionately
affected by HIV continues to be vital to curbing the pandemic. Although beliefs about HIV and
attitudes toward sexual minorities were once inextricable, advocacy agendas for advancing
sexual minorities and stopping AIDS are no longer predicated solely on one another’s success.
To more adequately address AIDS, the country must stop playing identity politics and begin the
work of saving lives as set forth in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy. The United States requires
a multifaceted approach to ending HIV and HIV stigma that integrates its response into various
services, questions institutions that disadvantage especially vulnerable populations, and never
forgets those individuals in whose benefit its AIDS policy should be primarily directed. AIDS
activists have carried the relief effort to the point that it is now best served by integrating it into
responses to other health and social issues. Advocates for sexual minorities, on the other hand,
have relied too heavily on integration, denying the realities of various movement constituents in
order to serve the interests of movement elites. The liberationist response to the early AIDS
crisis evidenced the power of sexual minorities to broaden their agenda and force progress
without apologizing for difference. Now, using the machinery of the integrationist movement to
advance a more liberationist agenda, sexual minorities have the power to propel society toward
greater justice for all.
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